Juan Luis Vives's critique of the Ius Civile as Mos Italicus

foundations for the constitution of moral philosophy, legal methodology and legal theory in the renaissance

Abstract

Background: In De Disciplinis (1531), the Spanish humanist philosopher and jurist Juan Luis Vives (1492-1540) undertakes, on the one hand, a critical review of the causes of the corruption of knowledge inherited from Antiquity and the Middle Ages, and, on the other hand, presents his restructured vision for the transmission of such knowledge. In this way, legal science, as practical knowledge, will occupy a significant part of Vives' reflection, not only in De Disciplinis, but in all his writings. It is therefore only necessary to highlight the theme in the context of this work. To do this, I will reconstruct some of his arguments in which he shows his critical view of the Ius Civile as mos italicus, configuring the decadence of law because it lacks the essentials required as criteria established by legal humanism. 

Objectives: This article aims to reconstruct and present the status of Roman Ius Civile (civil law) in the context of De causis corruptarum artium liber VII of De Disciplinis (1531) by Juan Luis Vives (1492-1540). To do this, I will reconstruct some of his arguments in which he shows his critical view of the Ius Civile as mos italicus, configuring the decadence of law because it lacks the essentials required as criteria established by legal humanism. 

Method: The method used in this research is deductive. We sought to gather a structured corpus and then critically analyze it in the light of secondary literature. Bibliographical review and historical-contextual hermeneutics.

Results: After analyzing the corpus in question, comparing it with secondary literature and surveying new material, it emerges that the legal humanism implicit in Juan Luis Vives' philosophy is part of a project to renew law, legal methodology and the theoretical constitution of legal theory in the 16th century.  

Conclusions: This article contributes in particular to the development of research in the field of legal theory and legal methodology, with a remote search for questions in Humanism. It also contributes to the deserved inclusion of authors marginalized by legal-theoretical historiography. In addition, it contributes to a return to an Iberian legal matrix, of which Brazil is deeply indebted in its origins, and from which a critical and contextual analysis that sheds light on today's legal-theoretical issues cannot be dispensed with.