Between prudence and pragmatism

an institutional approach to Public Law

Abstract

Contextualization: Legal pragmatism and the use of consequentialist reasoning have become central in Public Law due to the growing need to assess the practical effects of administrative and judicial decisions. However, when applied without clear normative criteria and without institutional coordination, these methods increase the risks of arbitrariness, subjectivism, and legal uncertainty, undermining the predictability and stability of institutions. The absence of autonomous parameters renders pragmatism insufficient as an independent decision-making foundation, requiring structures capable of providing rationality and control over the use of consequences within the decision-making process.

Objective: To propose a pragmatic and institutional normative theory capable of structuring legal deliberation and framing consequentialism into a rationally controllable, predictable, and institutionally grounded procedure.

Method: The research adopts a bibliographic and analytical-deductive approach, reviewing the literature on legal pragmatism and institutional theory. Based on this review, it systematizes a decision-making model grounded in pillars of institutional coordination and normative control filters.

Results: The study found that the legitimacy of pragmatic decision-making depends on three pillars and on two normative filters. These elements prevent intuitive decision-making and reinforce the connection between concrete decisions and stabilized institutional practices.

Conclusions: The research concludes that pragmatism lacks its own normative structure, and the proposed theory fills this gap by placing consequentialism within institutional limits. It also recognizes constraints arising from institutional fragmentation and highlights the need for future investigations into Article 30 of the LINDB and into the boundaries of pragmatic decision-making when fundamental rights are at stake.