Law according to John Finnis

legal authority explained by the requirement of legitimacy

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.12662/2447-6641oj.v24i45.6369.pe6369.2026

Keywords:

John Finnis, legal authority, legitimacy, legal validity, natural law

Abstract

Context: Contemporary debates in the philosophy of law renew the tension between natural law and analytical jurisprudence, particularly regarding the foundations of legal authority, obligation, and validity in John Finnis’s work.

Objective: To examine how Finnis explains legal authority through the requirement of legitimacy, articulating the Thomistic natural-law tradition with core categories of analytical jurisprudence.

Method: Bibliographical research and conceptual analysis, including a reconstruction of the Thomistic notion of practical reason and a systematic presentation of Finnis’s arguments on basic human goods, the common good, and the requirements of practical reasonableness.

Result: Legal authority is shown to claim obedience as a mechanism of social coordination ordered to the public common good, yet its normative force depends on legitimacy assessed by substantive and formal criteria; moreover, Finnis refines Hart’s internal point of view through the notions of central case and focal meaning, thereby providing a criterion for normatively relevant descriptions of practices and institutions.

Conclusions: Substantively, legitimacy requires the protection of basic human goods and the safeguarding of fundamental rights as circumstance-sensitive specifications grounded in practical reason; formally, it requires compliance with the requirements of practical reasonableness, avoiding arbitrariness, inefficiency, and departures from the common good. Laws enjoy a presumption of validity, which is qualified by grave injustices that contravene basic goods and affect validity in a focal sense, generally preserving systemic stability without abandoning rational standards of justice.

Author Biographies

Ayrton Borges Machado, Faculdade Católica de Belém

Doutor em Direito (UFPA). Mestre em Direito (UFPA). Professor na Faculdade Católica de Belém; Programa de Pós-Graduação em Direito - Universidade Federal do Pará (UFPA). Belém, PA, BR.

Ian Silveira Pompeu, UFPA

Doutorando em Direito (UFPA). Mestre em Filosofia (UFPA). Bacharel em Direito (CESUPA); integrante do Grupo de Pesquisa (CNPq) “Tradição da Lei Natural”; formação em latim pela academia Vivarium Novum. Fellow do Boethius Institute, professor de latim e artes liberais. Belém, PA, BR.

Victor Sales Pinheiro, UFPA

Professor da Universidade Federal do Pará (UFPA). Estágio de Pós-Doutorado pela Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul. Doutor em Filosofia pela UERJ (Tese sobre Heidegger e Platão). Mestre em Filosofia pela PUC-RIO (Dissertação sobre a República de Platão). Graduado em Direito no Centro Universitário do Pará. Belém, PA, BR.

EM ABERTO

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Published

2026-10-05

How to Cite

MACHADO, Ayrton Borges; POMPEU, Ian Silveira; PINHEIRO, Victor Sales. Law according to John Finnis: legal authority explained by the requirement of legitimacy. Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza), Fortaleza, v. 24, n. 45, p. e6369, 2026. DOI: 10.12662/2447-6641oj.v24i45.6369.pe6369.2026. Disponível em: https://periodicos.unichristus.edu.br/opiniaojuridica/article/view/6369. Acesso em: 6 oct. 2026.

Issue

Vol. 24 No. 45 (2026): EM ABERTO

Section

Artigos Originais

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Copyright (c) 2026 Ayrton Borges Machado, Ian Silveira Pompeu, Victor Sales Pinheiro

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